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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the concept of „risk‟ in relation to the theoretical study of old age and 
welfare in Europe. Ideas related with what has been conceptualised as the „risk society‟ (Beck, 1992) 
have, it might be argued, become part of the organising ground of how we define and position the 
„personal‟ and „social spaces‟ in which to grow old. This has startling continuities across Europe. 
These spaces have served to place the definition of what it means to be an older person – shifts from 
state care to individualised care (Phillipson and Powell, 2004). As Ulrich Beck (1992) claims, in the 
conditions of advanced modernity, growing old moves from being a collective to an individual 
experience and responsibility. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This article explores the concept of „risk‟ in relation to the theoretical study of old age 
and welfare in Europe. Ideas related with what has been conceptualised as the „risk society‟ 
(Beck, 1992) have, it might be argued, become part of the organising ground of how we 
define and position the „personal‟ and „social spaces‟ in which to grow old. This has startling 
continuities across Europe. These spaces have served to place the definition of what it means 
to be an older person – shifts from state care to individualised care (Phillipson and Powell, 
2004). As Ulrich Beck (1992) claims, in the conditions of advanced modernity, growing old 
moves from being a collective to an individual experience and responsibility. Further, 
Anthony Giddens (1998) suggests that old age is a social constructed category shaped in „late 
modernity‟ by its politically pioneered definition in terms of retirement: 
 
„Old age at sixty-five is a creation, pure and simple, of the welfare state. It is 
a form of welfare dependency much more widespread than any of the 
dependencies noted by the rightist interpreters of the underclass (1994:170). 
[And]:- A society that separates older people from the majority in a 
retirement ghetto cannot be called inclusive‟ (Giddens, 1998:120).   
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However, Giddens claims that risk is an important factor in the reflexive shaping of old 
age. First, it is claimed that traditional responses to risk are no longer appropriate. Second, 
and a key factor highlighting the point above, European societies are themselves less 
predictable. Faith in the ability of the State or scientific experts to manage risk on our behalf 
has therefore diminished. Third, people must anticipate and address risk. Whether this is best 
achieved by collectively sharing the responsibilities that may lead to individualisation. Four, 
traditional definitions of risk, premised on technical measures, neglect the social construction 
of these and of the risks themselves. This in turn poses fundamental questions about the way 
we define old age. By representing risk as a centrally defining discourse of “late modernity” 
offers a new perspective: it allows the interrogation of how older people are made subjects in 
Europe (Powell and Phillipson, 2004).  
Foremost in European societies with little developed welfare systems the concerns 
regarding the side effects of a society governed by the concepts of risk and individualisation 
are widely disseminated (Giddens, 1991). Linked to this, neo-liberalism gives the impression 
that older people have the capacity to generate their own autonomy and responsibility as 
indicative of „consumer culture‟ (Gilleard and Higgs, 2000) irrespective of structural 
constraints. Similarly, theorists advocating positive ageing pontificate from a cultural 
approach by focusing on the benefits of neo-liberalism (Gilleard and Higgs, 2000). This is 
particularly apparent in a move toward neo-liberal discourses of consumerism which 
artificially appears to indicate a reallocation of attention from responding to problems such as 
„poverty‟ (cf. Walker, 1981), for example to an attempt to define what it is to allegedly „age 
positively‟ in an neo-liberal era were older people “have never had it so good” (Gilleard and 
Higgs, 2000). For Gilleard and Higgs (2000) this trend is happening in western culture and 
greatly reconstructs both the formal expectations and personal experiences of later life. 
Interestingly, Gilleard and Higgs do not see the relevance of risk to the uncertain postmodern 
times through which older people express their performativity.  
Whilst such account is highly idealistic it does not highlight the critical features of 
everyday life of older people and the impingement on risk. Such an account represents an 
ideological distortion by not focusing on the uneven distributions of power across Europe for 
older people– such neo-conservative writers overlook the risk of hardship and poverty in old 
age Indeed, Alan Walker and Gerhard Naegele (1999) convey the critical message that there 
is a pressing need for governments and other agencies to respond to changing circumstances 
of an ageing European population. European political processes have become preoccupied 
with the fiscal support of the delivery of social services to an ageing population as this 
demographic shift alters the balance between those in work and paying taxes, and those in 
retirement receiving benefits and consuming health care and other social services. 
Consumption theorists such as Gilleard and Higgs (2000) overlook and underemphasize the 
risks attached the structural positioning of old age in Europe.  
The historical lesson is this. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s European governments 
uniformly sought to introduce market dynamics into the delivery of services by creating 
quasi-markets that rely on internal commissioning and purchasing by providers. In the United 
Kingdom for example, legislation required that local authorities embark upon a phased 
program, directed by central government, of compulsory competitive tendering, with the 
strategy of decreasing the role of local authorities and stimulating greater provision of 
services by the private sector. This program, like its cousins elsewhere on the continent such 
as France and Germany, rested on the belief that a competitive market and a mixed economy 
of welfare inevitably provides services that are better and cheaper than those available 
through the public sector, the reasoning being that a protected public bureaucracy is capable 
International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences 16(2) (2014) 132-143                                                                                                                        
-134- 
only of furnishing services that are limited, inflexible, and indeterminate and many users are 
unable to obtain the services they require. European governments assume that they can put in 
place a mixed economy of welfare to meet the needs of their populations and to facilitate 
consumer choice among the various services. However, the introduction of "choice" may in 
fact reduce the number of options available because a reduction in public sector provision 
may not be matched by the development of a diverse range of service options in the voluntary 
and private sector (Powell and Phillipson, 2004). Planning is necessary, particularly in light of 
the demographic changes. The statistical reality that Europe's population must inevitably age 
because the fertility boom in the late 1950s and early 1960s and the increasing expected 
average lifespan will greatly increase the number of older persons across the European Union 
from about 2020 forward.  
The spectre of an ageing population necessitates the dismantling of the welfare state and 
the introduction of a greater degree of reliance on personal financial provision and privately 
provided care arrangements. These proposals are linked to ideological shifts during the latter 
part of the twentieth century, and the concomitant reassessment of the social contract between 
the state and its population. As a result, "cradle-to-grave" principles of postwar social 
planning have been replaced by policies which encourage those with resources to make 
provision for themselves, with the less well off depending on minimal state support. This 
exclusion has serious implications for the workings of EU states, for over time the issues 
raised will test the stability and security of health and political structures in all European 
countries. In order to preserve the basic tenets of intergenerational solidarity and to develop a 
more inclusive society, it will be necessary to find ways in which the views of older people 
can be appropriately represented (Powell and Phillipson, 2004).  
Older citizens must have a greater "voice" in the decision-making process of welfare 
services provision. The point made by Walker and Naegelhe (1999) is abold one that a new 
political economy of ageing is needed to engender social policy that rests on a broader view 
of what older persons need and the manner in which they can contribute to and make a 
different society, rather than the current policies that focus alone on pension arrangements and 
the provision of social welfare. New policies are needed to meet the requirements of the risk 
society. The politics of old age is not just about learning to live with an older population and 
how to arrange the provision of services, but is more about rethinking the nature of European 
society itself.  
Indeed, in contemporary European society, risk is a broad concept that extends over a 
broad range of social practices that impinge on the experiences of older people. Current 
debates about older people and relationship to sexuality, crime, national security, food safety, 
employment and welfare are all underscored by risk (Phillipson, 1998). A recent report by the 
UN Commission suggests ways in which the security of older people, for example, might be 
advanced - from humanitarian and military strategies through to economic, health and 
educational strategies. Coupled with this, the US Central Intelligence Agency‟s (CIA) (2004) 
World Fact Book suggests that an “ageing population” is a risk to the financial safety of 
western nation states in US and Europe.  
Such an approach seeks to capture the dimensions of subjectivity within the social-
political constraints that shape individual lives. This allows reconstructions of logics of action 
or structuration behind current neo-liberal self-representations of ageing identity. It could be 
supposed that such constructions enable us to reconstruct the complexity of ageing in social 
contexts and the influence of, for example, social welfare on these experiences as a ground for 
risk perception. Importantly, the notion of an ageing society becomes secondary to the 
emphasis on the way in which families and individuals handle the demands associated with an 
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ageing population. Phillipson and Powell (2004, 33) suggest that there are three factors that 
make risk important to understanding old age: 
 
‘First, the globalisation of aging is increasingly recognised. All societies 
(poor as well as rich) are undergoing similar population transformations 
(albeit with notable exceptions such as those in countries devastated by the 
AIDS virus). Aging thus becomes simultaneously both a biographical event 
and one shared with different cultures and societies across the globe. 
Second, aging experiences are themselves hugely (and increasingly) diverse. 
Under the guise of the welfare state, growing old was compressed into a 
fairly limited range of institutions and identities (notably in respect of 
income and lifestyles). Aging in the post-welfare society, however, has 
substantially expanded in respect of social opportunities as well as economic 
inequalities. Third, old age is also being changed by what Beck (1992) 
describes as the era of reflexive modernization. This may be conceived in 
terms of how individuals and the lay public exert control and influence on 
the shape and character of modernity.’ 
 
The more European societies are modernised, the more older people acquire the ability 
to reflect upon the social forces of their existence within the conditions of risk constraints. 
Hence, we need to understand the major social forces which impinge on ageing itself. Such 
social forces that create risk associated with ageing implies a breakdown in trust as a key 
modernist principle in contemporary society. Hence, the rest of the article is in three parts: we 
introduce the relevance and breakdown in trust relations; map out the key assumptions of risk 
society in Europe; and critically engage with old age and examples drawn from social 
welfarism to consolidate an understanding of the constructedness of old age in Europe. 
 
 
2.  FROM TRUST TO RISK 
 
There are increasing attempts to conceptualize the notion of „trust‟ in social theory as a 
pivotal dimension of European society (Giddens, 1991). However, the early statement that 
„social science research on trust has produced a good deal of conceptual confusion regarding 
the meaning of trust and its place in social life‟ (Lewis and Weigert 1985 quoted in Powell, 
2005, 104) seems to be still valid especially as applied to aging studies. Trust is on the one 
hand incompatible with complete ignorance of the possibility and probability of future events, 
and on the other hand with emphatic belief when the anticipation of disappointment is 
excluded. Someone who trusts has an expectation directed to an event. The expectations are 
based on the ground of incomplete knowledge about the probability and incomplete control 
about the occurrence of the event. Trust is of relevance for action and has consequences for 
the trusting agent if trust is confirmed or disappointed. Thus, trust is connected with risk 
(Giddens, 1991). 
Up to now there have been few attempts to work out a systematic scheme of different 
forms of trust in between older people and individuals, institutions or policies that impinge on 
their identity performance. Social trust tends to be high among older people who believe that 
their public safety is high (Walker and Naegele 1999). Since the erosion of public trust in 
institutions such as, for example, the Brown government in UK with it losing 25 million 
people‟s bank details and identity or the £25 billion financial loss of UK bank Northern Rock 
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in late 2007 or the recently maligned „credit crunch‟, „trust‟ has attracted more and more 
attention. 
Molling (2001) distinguishes between trust in contracts between people and State (such 
as pension provision), trust in friendships across intergenerational lines, trust in love and 
relationships and trust in foreign issues (associated with national identity across the EU). 
However, sociological theories which suppose a general change in modernity (cf. Beck, 1992) 
assume that with the erosion of traditional institutions and scientific knowledge trust becomes 
an issue more often produced actively by individuals than institutionally guaranteed.  
There are a number of implications of risk perception and risk taking that indicates: trust 
is much easier to destroy than to built; if trust is once undermined it is more difficult to restore 
it; familiarity with a place, a situation or a person produces trust; persons will develop trust if 
a person or situation has ascriptive characteristics positively valued. Trust seems to be 
something that is produced individually by experience and over time and cannot be 
immediately and with purpose be produced by European governments without dialogical 
interaction with older people on issues affecting their lifestyles and life-chances such as care, 
pensions, employment and political representation in the EU (Walker and Naeghele, 2000). 
Though as Giddens (1991) stresses risk is the feature of a society shifting its emphasis 
away from trust on traditional ties and social values. How risks are perceived and formulated 
as a breakdown in trust reflects the essentially discursive practices of politics and power in 
European society. The ability to control and manage perceptions about moral intentions of a 
pervasive governmental rationality may be part of an understanding of risk. 
 
 
3.  BECK AND THE ‘RISK SOCIETY’ THESIS 
 
The concept of risk has come to assume accelerating prominence in sociological 
writings of Ulrich Beck.  Beck (1992) claims that modernization helps the self become an 
agent via processes of individualization which they both see as indicative of neo-liberalism; 
they advocate that the self become less constrained by traditional group identities and 
institutions but more constraint by the dynamics of markets (labour markets, consumer-
markets) and secondary institutions, and becomes therefore a project to be reflexively worked 
on in the context of a globalised world. As we see the development of this the new global 
order, some risks such as those caused by hazardous industries, are transferred away from the 
developed countries to the Third world. Thus while Beck sees risk society as a catastrophic 
society, what we are seeing is the transference of certain risks through aversion and 
management which in turn include a reorganisation of power and authority’ (Beck, 1982:4) 
Beck acknowledges that some social groups are more affected than others by the 
distribution and growth of risks, and these differences may be structured through inequalities 
of class and social position. The disadvantaged have fewer opportunities to avoid risk because 
of their lack of resources compared with the advantaged. By contrast, the wealthy to a degree  
(income, power or education), can purchase safety and freedom from risk (Beck 1992: 33). 
However, it is the gestation and the constellations of the risks, which are unknown, and thus 
risk affects those who have produced or profited from them, breaking down the previous 
social and geographic boundaries evident in modern societies.   
Beck (1992), argues that the „former colonies‟ of the western world are soon becoming 
the waste dumps of the world for toxic and nuclear wastes produced by more privileged 
countries.  Risks have become more and more difficult to calculate and control.  Hence it can 
be argued that Risks often affect both the wealthy and poor alike: „poverty is hierarchic and 
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smog is democratic‟ (Beck, 1992: 36). At the same time, because of the degree of 
interdependence of the highly specialised agents of modernisation in business, agriculture, the 
law and politics, there is no single agent responsible for any risk: „there is a general 
complicity, and the complicity is matched by a general lack of responsibility. Everyone is 
cause and effect‟ (:33) and so „perpetrator and victim become identical‟ (:38) in a consuming 
society. It is this immateriality and invisibility of the threats that saturate the „risk society‟ 
making it harder to identify the offender of global risk. Beck (1992), argues that this 
fundamentally poses the second challenge for analyses of these socially constituted industrial 
phenomena: interpretation becomes inherently a matter of perspective and hence political. 
Politicians constantly invoke science in their attempts to persuade the public that their policies 
and products are safe. The inescapability of interpretation makes risks infinitely malleable 
and, as Beck (1992:23) insists, „open to social definition and construction‟. This in turn put 
those in a position to define (and /or legitimate) risks – the mass media, scientists, politicians 
and the legal profession – in key social positions (Phillipson and Powell, 2004).  
Ulrich Beck (1996) makes the point that risk ‘is not an option which could be chosen or 
rejected in the course of political debate‟ (1996:28).  Instead this is an inescapable product 
and structural condition of advance industrialisation of where we produce the hazards of that 
system, in Beck‟s words (1996:31)„undermine and/or cancel the established safety systems of 
the provident state‟s existing risk calculation‟. Beck (1996) further exemplifies this point by 
examining contemporary hazards associated with nuclear power, chemical pollution and 
genetic engineering and bio technology that cannot be limited or contained to particular 
spaces, and that which cannot be grasped through the rules of causality, and cannot be 
safeguarded, compensated or insured against. They are therefore „glocal‟: both local and 
global. Risk society is thus „European risk society‟ and risks affect a European citizenship. 
The questioning of the outcomes of modernity in terms of their production of risks is an 
outcome of reflexive modernisation. An awareness of risk, therefore, is heightened at the level 
of the everyday.   
 In Europe, risk, in its purely technical meaning, came to rely upon conditions in which 
the probability estimates of an event are able to be known or knowable. This has the effect of 
paralysing action and bringing insurance systems that promised to cover eventualities into 
chaos. In Great Britain for example, the welfare state, an insurance system that promised to 
cater for people from cradle to the grave, is unable to sustain that promise for future 
generations. The welfare system as a system of social insurance is beginning to lose its 
legitimacy with the rise of private health insurance. In the USA, 70 % of its population do not 
have private health insurance (Powell and Phillipson, 2004). 
Scientists have lost their authority in relation to risk assessments most evidently seen in 
the collapse of endowment and certain pension funds. Scientific calculations are challenged 
more and more by political groups and activists. (Beck 1995:125-6). The nature of such 
hazards, therefore, returns the concept of risk to the pre-modern notion of „incalcuble 
insecurities‟. In common with such hazards, they „undercut the social logic of risk calculation 
and provision‟ (Beck 1995:77). For Beck, then, risk may be defined as „systematic way of 
dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itself‟ (Beck 
1991:21).  
If this might be happening to older people, what are the implications? Two 
developments seem to be responsible for the growing risk awareness in modern industrialised 
societies in Europe, even though their respective contribution is contested. The new 
awareness of the limits of the technical and the mathematical/statistical calculation of risk 
would cause an increase of concerns regarding the rational controllability of an uncertain 
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future (Beck 1992, Bonß 1995). Furthermore, the sustained endeavour to apply a new liberal 
style of governing modern societies would increasingly shift the responsibility of the 
management of risks and uncertainties from the state to the individual . Socio-demographic 
changes as well as shifts in governance contribute to the perception of risk and uncertainty 
regarding old age in two ways: First, they promote the understanding of risk and uncertainty 
in old age and second, they suggest to perceive age as risky and uncertain. 
In order to approach the concept of risk and old age it is suggested that by 
conceptualising risk in a broader framework of (un-)certainty (Zinn 2005) where risk is seen 
as a specific strategy to produce certainty in order to enable to act. Risk appears then as a 
certainty construction – a specific way to produce the necessary certainty as a prerequisite for 
action (Zinn 2004). Thereby the future becomes accessible for planning and action. In order to 
work on itself, the „self‟ or at least according to Beck (1992, 181) relates to self-political 
rationalities and risk: „risks become the motor of self-politicization of modernity in industrial 
society‟. One element of the „motor‟ of self-politicisation is how successful neo-liberalism has 
been in fashioning common sense discourses around its political rhetoric. Jurgen Habermas 
(1986, 13-14) claims what we are witnessing is a „completely altered relationship between 
autonomous and self-organized public spheres on the one hand, and sub-systems steered by 
money and administrative power on the other‟. Self-autonomization coupled with 
administrative power is indicative of „risk‟: neo-liberal features of social policy for older 
people. Older people living in neo-liberal EU societies have therefore moved towards a 
greater awareness of risk and are forced to deal with risks on an everyday basis: „Everyone is 
caught up in defensive battles of various types anticipating the hostile substances in one‟s 
manner of living and eating‟ (Beck, 1994: 45). The media for their part have taken up 
warnings of experts about risk and communicate them to their mass publics in the EU.   
There is an ambivalence at the heart of Europe: on the one hand, older people are to be 
„managed‟ by other administrative powers such as professional experts in modernity (Powell 
and Phillipson, 2004); on the other hand, older people are left to govern themselves. This 
moral idea of freedom and responsibility is involved in the modern notion to govern European 
societies (Foucault 1991) but is determined by the limits of everyday life in socioculturally 
different circumstances (Bourdieu 1979) within a „risk society‟ (Beck, 1992). The tension 
between ideal and socio-cultural structured life constitutes the battleground of the disputes on 
the governance of old age. These, along with ties between generations, created a social, 
economic and moral space within which growing numbers of older people could be 
channelled and contained. For example, for a period of 20 years or more, moving older people 
into the zone of retirement and the welfare state, held at bay the underlying issue of securing a 
place and identity for ageing within the framework of an advanced capitalist society. The 
meaning of later life was, temporarily at least, constructed out of a modernist vision where 
retirement and welfare were viewed as natural end-points to the human life cycle. 
 
 
4.  THE GOVERNANCE OF UNCERTAINTY IN WELFARE AND OLD AGE 
 
The governance of old age originally developed  and was closely linked to the creation 
of a social security system and the welfare state. The idea of prudence and self-responsibility 
among the working class was expressed through such institutions as the friendly society and 
the revolving building society and promoted both political quiescence and the stability needed 
to ensure steady growth in the later half of the 19
th
 century (Dean 1999). This system was 
supplanted by the development of insurance in the 20
th
 century leading to the modern welfare 
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state (Ewald 1986, O‟Malley 2000). The provision for old age was originally not central, 
because at the end of the 19
th
 century most people did not reach the age of 70 to claim a 
pension and live through this last phase of their life without having to work. The original 
concept was to save the worker and its family in case of death or disablement of the 
breadwinner.  
The strategies of risk-management by means of insurance were understood as sharing 
them between all insured people, which should be in principle as much as possible. But this 
fundamental concept has changed recently as part of a general change in the idea of insurance 
as well as the government of citizens. The responsibility of the state and thereby the risks are 
given back to the public. As Baker and Simon (2002, 4) recently pointed out, “…private 
pensions, annuities, and life insurance are engaged in an historic shift of investment risk from 
broad pools (the classic structure of risk spreading through insurance) to individual (middle-
class) consumers and employees in return for the possibility of greater return.” 
The understanding of the individual as a self-responsible actor as given for granted 
underestimates the various resources and life experiences different people possess. The 
strategies to cope with risk and uncertainty in the life course are rather oriented on the 
circumstances of everyday life, personal values and life experiences that relate to self-
responsibility. Governmental programmes are mainly developed against the background of 
the model of a self-responsible actor, and increasingly address people with significant lack of 
cultural and economic resources as self-reflexive and rational actors (Taylor-Gooby 2006). 
Although this concept might be generally helpful in order to formulate political programmes 
they regularly fail because of this assumption. 
The governmental constructions of risks and old age converge in the notion of rational 
acting old people. It does conceptually ignore that the ability to be autonomous and rational is 
not a question of context-independent (free) will or something what is just given, but it is 
provided by context factors as well as biographical experiences which shape expectations 
regarding the future. Thereby accumulated “local knowledge” (Wynne 1996) produces logics 
of how to act best in an uncertain context (e.g. Zinn 2005), which include the policy of the 
government as well. This is not only important when people are old, but in earlier life phases 
when they have to deal with their expectations regarding old age and have to take 
precautionary measures. The unequal resources available, the unreflected routines and the 
needs and execution of everyday life shape what is the basis to act in „old age‟ (Powell and 
Phillipson, 2004). 
The extrication of these actions can be traced to at least three types of crisis affecting 
the management of aging populations in the last quarter of the twentieth century across 
Europe: economic, social and cultural. The economic dimension has been well-rehearsed, 
with successive crises from the mid-1970s onwards undermining, first, the goal of full 
employment (and hence destabilising retirement), and, second, the fiscal basis of the welfare 
state (accelerated with the onset of a privatisation from the 1980s onwards) (Estes, 2001).  
However we are neither a  provident state  and  or a providing state.  The dialectic of 
risk  and social insurance systems of calculation  have failed to address or predict  the increase 
in longevity, the blurring of the life-course and the growing trend for smaller families.  What 
we are beginning to see occur with  entry and immersion  in to a risk society  is the fracturing 
of insurance social systems that have failed to make accurate predictions in the EU (Powell 
and Phillipson, 2004). This has led for those who can afford to invest in various insurance 
policies ways of minimizing risk that may befall them in times, when illness occurs, 
unemployment (i.e: mortgage protection),  death, which  are all sold on the basis of what may 
happen in the future. The short fall of this is that elders from lower socio-economic groups 
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who without insurance will be caught  within the widening  fractures appearing in the welfare 
state. Old age is also being changed by what Beck (1992) describes as the era of reflexive 
modernization. This may be conceived in terms of how individuals and the lay public exert 
control and influence on the shape and character of Europe.  
 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
  
How do we define "old age"? Is it a stage in life defined by a particular age or event 
such as retirement, is it determined by physical characteristics and the loss of independence, 
or is it an artifact of social structures? Indeed, is it helpful to categorize people as being "old" 
at all, as opposed to being "disadvantaged" or "dependent"? It may be inaccurate to expect 
older people to see themselves as a category with particular health needs and wants. Hence, 
the key task is to analyse the interplay between social policy and the lives of individuals, 
families or groups and communities. The expectation of negative events in the future and the 
different ways of how to respond to such expectations is central for the sociological approach 
to risk and uncertainty (Zinn 2004). Part of this reflexive response is the importance of 
recognising self-subjective dimensions of emotions, trust, biographical knowledge and 
resources (Zinn 2005) that impinge on the existential shaping old age. Hence, our discussion 
provides a critical narrative to the importance to the study of old age and welfarism in Europe. 
It has become commonplace for academics and practitioners to explore, develop and apply an 
assortment of social science perspectives on risk. In a post 9/11 world, questions around risk 
and risk management have become ever more pertinent, leading to reflections on a number of 
different levels about „ontological security‟.  
We are left with two questions: how do older people manage their sense of well being in 
a world in which less and less can be taken for granted? To what extent does the spectre of 
global risks interplay with more routine insecurities which reach to the capillary texture of 
day-to-day life of older people? There is an urgency to reflect on these questions to 
understand the subject positioning of older people in a European society that is characterised 
by increasing uncertainty and risk. Indeed, it is perhaps emblematic of contemporary western 
culture that each of the technologies identified above offers the promise of escape from, rather 
than a deepened understanding of aging identity. Those who do not conform to the utopian 
dream appear to have been shunted into a non -participative discourse, bounded by 
professional surveillance or the more palatable yet closely related discourse of “monitoring”. 
In both cases, it could be suggested that a discourse on dependency has been  supplemented, 
and in some cases replaced, by a discourse on risk. The risk of giving in to an aging body, the 
risk of thereby being excluded from one‟s retirement community, the risk of being too poor to 
maintain a consumer lifestyle, the risk of being excluded from participation through 
incapacity that has been externally assessed, the risk of being abused, the risk of control being 
taken out of one‟s hands, the risk of tokenism in partnership, and the risk of losing resources. 
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